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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
plaintiff, injured by an exploding bottle she had placed in her shopping
cart, had not yet purchased the product. The court in Thompson v.
Reedman, supra, expressly stated that it had no doubt that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania would reach its result so long as there had been
some purchase of the goods through which the plaintiff could claim.
While neither of these cases would be binding upon the Supreme
Court, they do represent the "developing case law" referred to in the
Official Comment to Section 2-318. Because of the notoriety and general
approval given to these cases, it is difficult to believe that the court
was unaware of them. However, the court blanketly stated, "In no
case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manufacturer for breach
of an implied warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in the dis-
tributive chain. In fact, the inescapable conclusion from Loch v. Con-
fair . . . is that no warranty will be implied in favor of one who
is not in the category of a purchaser." (Emphasis by the court.) This
statement perhaps will save the decisions in Jarnot and Duckworth
v. Ford Motor Co., annotated supra, under Section 2-314, but will cast
a long shadow on the Reedman decision.
The now eroded privity doctrine was a creature of the courts at
a time when distribution of goods had little resemblance to modern
practices. This court states, however, that the legislature now has
the responsibility for altering that doctrine. The result may be an
unfortunate return to the decisions denying recovery to guests of the
actual buyers of food in restaurants or drive-ins. After all, these, as
well as guests in the home and members of the family, can reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.]
Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-314, supra.
ARTICLE 6: BULK TRANSFERS
SECTION 6-110. Subsequent Transfers.
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by
reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article, then:
(1) a purchaser of any of such property from such transferee who
pays no value or who takes with notice of such non-compliance takes sub-
ject to such defect, but
(2) a purchaser for value in good faith and without such notice takes
free of such defect.
In the Matter of Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962).
This litigation was between two trustees in bankruptcy to deter-
mine in which bankrupt's estate property should be placed. Lewis
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Dion, as an individual, operated a number of discount houses until
January 1, 1957. On that date he transferred all of the business assets
to a corporation, Dee's, Inc., which he wholly owned. There was no
compliance with Article 6 of the Code although it appears that this
was a bulk transfer. Dee's, Inc. also assumed all of Dion's individual
liabilities.
On March 10, 1958, Dee's, Inc. filed a petition for an arrangement
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. On April 10, an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy was filed against Dion. On June 18, 1958, both
Dee's, Inc. and Dion were adjudicated bankrupts. This petition for
reclamation was brought by the trustee of Dion against the trustee of
Dee's, Inc. for the assets transferred to the corporation. Dion's trustee
alleged a right to the property under Sections 70c and 70e of the Bank-
ruptcy Act on the ground that the transfer was voidable under Article 6
of the Code, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Statute
of 13 Elizabeth. The court affirmed a denial of the reclamation petition,
holding that the trustee of Dee's, Inc. was a subsequent transferee for
value without notice of outstanding equity and that since the transfer
was voidable, not void, the trustee of Dee's, Inc. obtained good title
to the property.
[Annotator's Comment: A trustee in bankruptcy does not enjoy
the position of a bona fide purchaser from the bankrupt under Sec-
tion 70c of the Bankruptcy Act. Since Section 6-110(2) provides only
that a good faith purchaser for value takes free of the defect, the
petition should not be denied for the reason given by the court. If
this case says, in effect, that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy will
cut off rights of the creditor under Article 6, the case is incorrect.
However, Section 6-111 provides for a six month statute of limitations
for actions brought under Article 6, and it is apparent from the facts
that the petitioner's action for reclamation was not brought within that
time. There was some discussion in an earlier report of this case about
the possibility of an equitable lien existing when the parties to the
transfer failed to comply with the Code provisions, but this is com-
pletely avoided by the court. See In the Matter of Dee's, Inc., 164 F.
Supp. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1958) and In re Dee's, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 550
(E.D. Pa. 1961).]
SECTION 6-111. Limitation of Actions and Levies.
No action under this Article shall be brought nor levy made more than
six months after the date on which the transferee took possession of the
goods unless the transfer has been concealed. If the transfer has been con-
cealed, actions may be brought or levies made within six months after its
discovery.
In the Matter of Dee's, Inc., 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 6-110, supra.
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